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In 2012 the Minister of Health made the Regulations Relating to 
the Artificial Fertilisation of Persons, which provide that the 
woman who intends to be made pregnant with an in vitro embryo 
owns such an embryo and can control the embryo's fate in 
specified ways. Given that in vitro embryos are outside the 
woman's body, the rationale for these provisions cannot be to 
protect the woman's bodily integrity. These provisions are, 
however, problematic from a constitutional perspective, as they: 
exclude fathers across the board, and impede the right of all 
intended parents who will not gestate the pregnancy, like 
surrogacy commissioning parents, to make decisions regarding 
reproduction – which include the right not to reproduce and 
hence to veto the further use of an in vitro embryo for 
reproductive purposes. Robinson argues that the legislative 
intent with the 2012 Regulations was not to establish ownership 
of in vitro embryos, and that in vitro embryos are not legal objects 
(or subjects), but rather form part of the legal subjectivity of their 
parents. I respond that the language used in the relevant 
provision is plain and clear in establishing ownership of in vitro 
embryos, and that in vitro embryos are therefore legal objects. I 
further suggest that Robinson's proposition of in vitro embryos 
forming part of the legal subjectivity of their parents may address 
the gender equality concern with the 2012 Regulations, but that 
it in turn causes other problems. In particular, Robinson's 
rationale for his proposition is problematic, as it appears to 
conflate the embryo with the prospective child. I rely on the 
important recent judgment in Ex Parte KAF 2019 2 SA 510 (GJ) 
that held explicitly that the in vitro embryo should not be equated 
with the prospective child. Finally, I respond to Robinson's 
critique of my 2005 article, by clarifying the research questions 
and answers of that article. I highlight the importance of the 
moral status of the in vitro embryo to legal and ethical debates 
relating to the in vitro embryo, and invite academic debate on the 
topic. 
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1 Introduction 
We are fortunate, however, to live in an era where the effects of infertility can 
be ameliorated to a large extent through assistive reproductive technologies. 
The technological advances seen over the last half century have greatly 
expanded the reproductive avenues available to the infertile. These 
reproductive avenues should be celebrated as they allow our society to 
flourish in ways previously impossible.1 
In vitro fertilisation ("IVF") entails that embryos are created outside a 
woman's body in a laboratory – so-called "in vitro embryos" – before being 
placed in the woman's body. The main purpose of this technology is to 
overcome various infertility issues. When using IVF, a fertility clinic would 
typically create a batch of six to eight embryos at a time. These embryos 
are closely monitored over a number of days. Embryos that show signs of 
being unviable would be discarded. At five or six days after fertilisation, one 
or two viable embryos – sometimes more – are transferred to the mother's 
womb. The remaining embryos will typically be cryopreserved. If a 
pregnancy does not ensue, some of the remaining embryos can be thawed 
and transferred to the mother's womb. If a pregnancy does ensue, the 
remaining cryopreserved embryos can be destroyed, kept in 
cryopreservation for future use by the same woman (but for no longer than 
ten years), donated for use by another woman, or donated for research. 
According to the most recent available data on IVF in South Africa, more 
than 4 000 IVF cycles were performed in 2014, resulting in 803 live births.2  
While there has been a steady stream of reported cases regarding in vitro 
embryo-related disputes in some foreign jurisdictions, South Africa has not 
experienced any such (reported) litigation. The first case in South Africa to 
address the legal status of the in vitro embryo – although not in the context 
of any dispute, but in the context of a surrogacy agreement confirmation 
hearing – was Ex Parte KAF,3 being a recent judgment of the Johannesburg 
High Court that I discuss in this article.  
Perhaps because of – or maybe despite – the paucity of South African case 
law dealing with the in vitro embryo, legal scholars have weighed in on the 
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1  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 SA 570 (CC) para 3. Minority judgment 
by Khampepe J. 
2  South African Registry for Assisted Reproductive Techniques 2015 http://anara-
africa.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/SARA-2014-22.05.2017.pdf 13.  
3  AB v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 SA 570 (CC). 
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subject. In a recent article4 in this journal, Robinson presents a thoughtful 
analysis of the question whether the in vitro embryo is a legal subject or a 
legal object – or, as he proposes, neither: He concludes that the in vitro 
embryo is included in its parents' legal subjectivity. In his article he critiques, 
among others, my own 2005 article5 on a related topic. I gladly pick up the 
gauntlet. In this response article, I set out to defend and expand on my 
position, and to provide reasons why I do not agree with Robinson's 
proposition that the in vitro embryo is included in its parents' legal 
subjectivity.  
This article is structured as follows: In Part 2, I familiarise the reader with 
key terms relevant to this article. Next, in Part 3, I sketch some background 
regarding the politics of the debate on whether an embryo should qualify 
qua legal subject. My analysis of the law relating to the embryo's legal 
subject/object status, including Robinson's arguments in this regard, is 
presented in Part 4. This is followed in Part 5 by general remarks on the 
ownership of embryos. I discuss practical questions, such as whether 
ownership in embryos can be transferred, and highlight some constitutional 
concerns with the way in which embryo ownership is currently provided for 
in our law. This sets the stage to engage, in Part 6, with Robinson's 
proposition that an in vitro embryo is part of its parents' legal subjectivity. 
Part 7 is my response to Robinson's critique of my 2005 article. I conclude 
the article in Part 8 by calling for legislative action to address the deficiencies 
in the extant law related to the in vitro embryo.  
2 Notes on terminology 
2.1 Pre-embryo versus embryo 
Jurisdictions that allow research on embryos almost universally employ the 
"fourteen-day rule".6 South Africa is no exception.7 This rule entails that 
research on embryos can be permitted only up to the fourteenth day after 
fertilisation. Dr Anne McLaren, a member of the influential Warnock 
Committee that first proposed the fourteen-day rule, coined the term "pre-
embryo" to describe the embryo within the first fourteen days after 
fertilisation.8 Given the influence of the fourteen-day rule, using the term 
"pre-embryo" seemed convenient, and gained currency in bioethical 
                                            
4  Robinson 2018 PELJ. 
5  Jordaan 2005 SALJ 237-249. 
6  Hyun, Wilkerson and Johnston 2016 Nature 169, 171. 
7  National Health Act 61 of 2003 ("NHA") s 57(4). 
8  Trounson "Why do Research on Human Pre-embryos?" 14.  
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discourse. In my 2005 article, I indeed used the term pre-embryo. However, 
as I have noted in my more recent work,9 the term pre-embryo has 
increasingly been subject to critique.10 From both sides of the bio-political 
spectrum – those who view the fourteen-day rule as an arbitrary and 
unnecessary limit on scientific research, and those who view any research 
on embryos as morally objectionable – the term pre-embryo has been 
described as a semantic ploy designed to give a scientific appearance to 
the legal status quo of the fourteen-day rule. Accordingly, in the interest of 
focussing on substance rather than on semantics, in this response article I 
simply refer to the embryo, or the in vitro embryo as the case may be, and 
not the pre-embryo. However, references to my previous article still use the 
term pre-embryo. Where this occurs, the term is intended to convey only its 
meaning as defined in my previous article, namely the embryo within the 
first fourteen days after fertilisation, and not to convey any bio-political 
agenda.  
2.2 Moral status 
"Moral status" (also referred to as "moral standing" or "moral 
considerability") typically means that an entity has interests that we must – 
from a moral perspective – respect for the entity's own sake. For instance, 
most people agree that a table or a chair does not have any moral status. 
One cannot wrong the chair by kicking it. (One can of course wrong the 
chair's owner or possessor by kicking the chair, but that is something 
extrinsic to the chair itself.) On the other side of the spectrum, most people 
would agree that kicking a child (without good cause, such as self-defence) 
is wrong in relation to the child. But what about a dog or a cat? Is causing 
unnecessary suffering to a sentient animal morally wrong in relation to that 
animal? (I emphasise morally to remind the reader not to confuse this moral 
question with a legal one.) If the answer to this question is affirmative, it 
means that sentient animals have a moral status.  
Some scholars adhere to a threshold concept of moral status, meaning that 
an entity is perceived to either possess full moral status or not. Others, 
including myself, adhere to a scalar concept of moral status, which makes 
provision for the gradual upscaling of levels of respect for the entity's 
interests aligned with certain criteria. For example, one may agree that a 
dog or a cat has moral status (and is morally wronged by being kicked 
gratuitously), but this does not mean that one necessarily posits canine or 
                                            
9  Jordaan 2017 SAJHR 429-451. 
10  See, eg Williams, Kitzinger and Henderson 2003 SHI 793. 
DW THALDAR  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  5 
feline moral status on a par with the (fuller or more respect-demanding) 
moral status of a human being.  
2.3 Legal status 
"Legal status" can refer to any position that something or someone holds in 
law. Three examples will suffice: The legal status of the white rhinoceros is 
that of a protected species; the legal status of cannabis is that it has been 
decriminalised by the Constitutional Court for personal consumption by 
adults in private; and the legal status of a hypothetical plaintiff in a lawsuit 
can be that of a woman over the age of majority, who is widowed, and is a 
refugee. One kind of legal status that is fundamental in our law is the legal 
subject—legal object dichotomy. A "legal subject" – which in law is used 
synonymously with the word "person" – is an entity that is capable of having 
legal rights, duties, and capacities.11 A "legal object" is the opposite, namely 
an entity that is not capable of having legal rights, duties, and capacities.12 
Given the above definitions, there is no space in between or outside this 
twofold division of entities: Either an entity is capable of having legal rights, 
duties and capacities, or he, she or it is not. In the South African legal 
universe, all entities are either subjects or objects. 
3 The politics of qualifying qua legal subject 
Although ethics and the law can influence each other, they are distinct 
systems. Determining whether an entity is capable of having legal rights, 
duties and capacities is a matter of legal policy, and is not dependent – at 
least not directly – on factors that are often relied on in moral status debates, 
like cognitive ability and sentience. Even having a physical body is not a 
factor. For instance, juristic persons certainly have no cognitive ability and 
sentience themselves, and exist only as mental constructs, and yet the law 
deems them capable of having legal rights, duties, and capacities. This 
highlights an important aspect of legal subjectivity: Being capable of having 
legal rights, duties, and capacities does not mean being capable of oneself 
personally enforcing legal rights, complying with legal duties, or even 
understanding any of these. Another legal subject better capable of 
personally performing the relevant juristic acts can act on one's behalf; 
another legal subject can even be legally duty-bound to act on one's behalf 
in certain situations. Accordingly, the in vitro embryo's lack of cognitive 
ability and sentience (and its microscopic size) are not necessarily obstacles 
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12  Kruger and Skelton Law of Persons in South Africa 13. 
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to being legally deemed capable of having legal rights, duties, and 
capacities.  
Legal subjects can be divided into two main categories: natural legal 
subjects and juristic legal subjects. Natural legal subjects, which is the 
category relevant to the topic of this article, are human organisms from the 
moment of being born alive, until they die. Although natural persons are 
legally deemed to be capable of having legal rights, duties, and capacities, 
such capability does not equate to actually having all conceivable legal 
rights and duties, and full capacities that are provided for in our law; natural 
persons may have different sets of rights and duties, and different levels of 
capacity to perform legal acts. Importantly, however, all natural persons 
enjoy the rights enumerated in the Constitution. (The entitlement of juristic 
persons to enjoy these rights is more circumscribed: it depends on the 
nature of the right and the nature of the juristic person.) The Bill of Rights is 
like a giant safety net that automatically provides a minimum level of legal 
protection to all natural legal subjects. Accordingly, if one believes that the 
embryo has full moral status, having the law recognise embryos as legal 
subjects in their own right would be a rational – and ambitious – objective. 
Legal objects, on the other hand, are per definition not capable of having 
any rights, and can therefore never qualify for the protection of any of the 
rights enumerated in the Constitution. Nevertheless, being a legal object 
does not mean that an entity can simply be treated in any way. The way in 
which one interacts with a legal object within one's dominium may be subject 
to legal rules aimed at the protection of such a legal object, like animals that 
are protected against inhumane treatment and buildings that are declared 
as national monuments. However, from the perspective of those who 
believe the embryo to have full moral status, having the law denote embryos 
as legal objects – even with specific protections – may seem morally 
perilous, and the proper object of legal or political activism for change. 
Should one believe that in vitro embryos have a degree of moral status, but 
not full moral status, classifying them as legal objects, while putting certain 
protections in place, seems to be the appropriate legal avenue. However, a 
common approach worldwide is to associate "respect" for the in vitro 
embryo with putting in place strict legal and ethical rules regarding the use 
of the in vitro embryo – especially in respect of research using embryos.13 
It is not clear how this approach is always rationally connected to "respect" 
for the in vitro embryo – especially if the relevant rules do not ultimately 
                                            
13  See Jordaan 2008 J Med & L 417-437. 
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protect the in vitro embryo. A more rational approach would require that the 
interests that should be respected for the embryo's own sake be identified, 
and that legal protections be designed to protect these interests. 
Lastly, should one believe that in vitro embryos lack moral status, any 
protections for the in vitro embryo would be unnecessary and irrational. 
Moreover, a strict legal-ethical regime regarding the use of the in vitro 
embryo would be perceived as only serving to frustrate and obstruct the 
interests of other entities who actually do have moral status. To illustrate 
with an example: cancer patients have an interest in a cure for cancer being 
developed through embryonic stem cell research, which in turn requires 
research on in vitro embryos, but the latter research is frustrated by over-
regulation.14 
4 The law relating to the embryo's legal subject/object 
status 
4.1 The in vitro embryo as object of ownership 
In 2012 the Minister of Health promulgated the Regulations Relating to the 
Artificial Fertilisation of Persons15 ("the 2012 Regulations") in terms of 
section 68 of the National Health Act ("NHA").16 Regulation 18(2) provides 
that:  
After artificial fertilisation, the ownership of a zygote or embryo effected by 
donation of male and female gametes is vested –  
(a) in the case of a male gamete donor, in the recipient; and 
(b) in the case of a female donor, in the recipient. 
In 2016 the Minister of Health published updated draft Regulations Relating 
to the Artificial Fertilisation of Persons17 ("the 2016 draft Regulations") for 
public comment. It is noteworthy that the embryo-ownership provision is 
retained in exactly the same formulation in the 2016 draft Regulations. 
A "recipient" is defined in Regulation 1 as "a female person in whose 
reproductive organs a male gamete or gametes are to be introduced by 
other than natural means; or in whose uterus/womb or fallopian tubes a 
                                            
14  See Jordaan 2007 SALJ 618-634. 
15  Regulations Relating to the Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (GN R175 in GG 35099 
of 2 March 2012). 
16  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
17  Regulations Relating to the Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (GN 1165 in GG 40312 
of 30 September 2016). 
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zygote or embryo is to be placed for the purpose of human reproduction". 
In other words, the "recipient" is the intended gestational mother – not 
necessarily the intended legal mother or the genetic mother. 
The in vitro embryo’s being the object of ownership has a clear and 
necessary implication for the in vitro embryo's legal subject/object status: 
Only legal objects can be owned; ergo, the in vitro embryo is a legal object. 
However, Robinson presents two arguments to counter this implication of 
the in vitro embryo being a legal object. In the following paragraphs, I 
analyse each of these counter-arguments. 
4.2 Counter-argument 1: The embryo-ownership provision is not 
explicit enough 
The first counter-argument can be summarised as follows:  
 Premise 1: At common law, the in vitro embryo is not owned. 
 Premise 2: A legislative provision that purports to alter the common 
law must do so explicitly. 
 Premise 3: Regulation 18(2) does not explicitly enough provide for the 
in vitro embryo to be owned.  
 Conclusion: The in vitro embryo is not owned. 
Robinson's proposition that at common law the in vitro embryo is not owned 
(Premise 1) is not substantiated with reference to any passage from any 
common law source. However, this is not even relevant, because the claim 
that Regulation 18(2) is not sufficiently explicit in providing for the ownership 
of in vitro embryos (Premise 3) is a denial of the obvious. The reader is 
invited to again read Regulation 18(2) as quoted above. It uses plain and 
clear language. In fact, it could not have been more explicit in providing that 
ownership is established over the in vitro embryo. Therefore, even if 
Premise 1 is true (which is unlikely), Premise 3 is false, hence rendering the 
conclusion invalid.  
4.3 Counter-argument 2: The embryo-ownership provision is not 
comprehensive enough 
The second counter-argument appears to be: Regulation 18(2) fails to 
provide who the owner of an in vitro embryo will be in all possible situations. 
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Therefore, the Minister of Health could not have intended for any in vitro 
embryo to be owned.  
Clearly the logic of the second counter-argument is flawed. Assuming that 
it is true that Regulation 18(2) fails to provide who the owner of an in vitro 
embryo will be in all possible situations, it does not follow that ownership of 
an in vitro embryo in situations that are clearly provided for, is somehow 
unintended.  
4.4 Conclusion on the in vitro embryo's legal subject/object status 
The 2012 Regulations definitely have shortcomings that I explore below. 
However, one thing is certain: Regulation 18(2) provides in plain and clear 
language that the in vitro embryo is the object of ownership. The 
unavoidable implication is that the in vitro embryo is a legal object. Note that 
this does not imply that the in vitro embryo is necessarily a typical legal 
object. On the contrary, it is unique, as I explore further below.  
5 General remarks on the ownership of embryos 
The premise of Robinson's second counter-argument, namely that the 2012 
Regulations fail to provide who the owner of an in vitro embryo will be in all 
possible situations, raises important questions of statutory interpretation 
and potential impact: Is there such a gap in the legislative scheme regarding 
embryo ownership, and, if so, how consequential is it?  
5.1 Original acquisition of embryo ownership 
Let us first consider Regulation 10(2)(a) of the 2012 Regulations, which 
reads as follows: 
A competent person shall not effect in vitro fertilisation except for embryo 
transfer, to a specific recipient and then only by the union of gametes removed 
or withdrawn from the bodies of –  
(i) such recipient and an individual male gamete donor; or  
(ii) an individual male and an individual female gamete donor; 
The formulation of this Regulation is clumsy, but I suggest that it means to 
say the following: A competent person (in this context, an embryologist) may 
create an in vitro embryo only if the following conditions are met: (a) the in 
vitro embryo is intended for reproduction in general (and not for scientific 
research, for instance); (b) there is a specific recipient for the in vitro 
embryo; and (c) the in vitro embryo will be created from gametes (not from 
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a denucleated egg and the nucleus of a skin cell, or from an induced 
pluripotent stem cell, for instance). Condition (b) is relevant to our present 
purposes. Clearly an in vitro embryo may be created only if there is a 
specific woman who intends to become pregnant with such an embryo. 
Accordingly, the legislative scheme intends all in vitro embryos to have 
owners from the moment of creation. 
5.2 Can embryo ownership be transferred? 
What appears to be problematic, as highlighted by Robinson, is what 
happens after an embryo's creation. This, I suggest, will largely depend on 
the degree to which embryo ownership is deemed to be transferable. Let us 
analyse two possible interpretations: The first interpretation would be that 
embryo ownership is freely transferable. An argument in favour of this 
interpretation could be based on the following considerations: Our common 
law generally favours autonomy, such as the freedom of contract, and the 
freedom of testation; and although sections 60(1)(a) and 60(2) of the NHA 
ban trade in embryos, the NHA and the Regulations are silent on non-trade-
related transfer of ownership such as donation and inheritance. If this 
interpretation is adopted, the original owner, namely the recipient, will be 
able to transfer ownership to other legal subjects, or contractually to make 
provision for the joint ownership of the embryos – presumably (but not 
necessarily) with her spouse or partner. In the event of the embryo owner's 
death, the embryos will fall in her deceased estate, and will be inherited 
either according to her will, or intestate, whichever the case may be. 
However, an embryo owner would also be able to intentionally abandon her 
in vitro embryos, and such embryos would consequently become res 
derelicta. Given that an embryo owner always has the option to donate her 
embryos or simply to have them destroyed, intentional abandonment seems 
like an unlikely but theoretically possible occurrence in the context of the 
freely transferable interpretation, hence minimally vindicating Robinson's 
premise (namely that Regulation 18(2) fails to provide who the owner of an 
in vitro embryo will be in all possible situations). 
An alternative interpretation of the Regulations would be that embryo 
ownership is transferable only to another specific recipient. An argument in 
favour of this interpretation would need to rely on implied legislative 
intention. In this regard, Regulation 10(2)(c) of the 2012 Regulations can be 
relied upon. It reads as follows: 
a competent person shall destroy an embryo, which she or he has in storage 
as soon as the recipient for whom that embryo has been effected conceives 
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or as soon as it is decided not to go ahead with the embryo transfer into that 
recipient, unless –  
(i) the competent person decides, and with the informed consent of the 
recipient, to store such embryo for a further period for the purpose of a 
subsequent embryo transfer to that recipient; or 
(ii) the recipient consents in writing that the competent person- 
(aa)  may, with the informed consent of such recipient, use such 
embryo for transfer to another specific recipient; or 
(bb)  may, with the informed consent of such recipient, use the embryo 
for a purpose, other than embryo transfer, which purpose shall 
be stated in that consent. 
Note the terminology of this provision: It consistently refers to the informed 
consent of the recipient – not the owner. Also note that such informed 
consent by the recipient is not only necessary but also sufficient to trigger 
the various discretionary powers of the competent person listed in the 
provision relating to the use or the destruction of the in vitro embryo. 
Accordingly, assuming that ownership can be transferred to anybody other 
than a specific recipient, the transferee would receive ownership in name 
only, without any actual rights attached to it. The presumption against 
ineffective provisions would suggest that allowing for such futile transactions 
could not be the legislative intent. This argument tilts the scales in favour of 
the specific-recipient-only embryo ownership interpretation. 
In the context of this interpretation, the issue of intentional abandonment by 
an embryo owner has a ready solution: Given that the embryo owner is 
always a specific recipient, abandonment will necessarily constitute a 
decision "not to go ahead with the embryo transfer into that recipient", as 
contemplated in Regulation 10(2)(c) – which will automatically trigger the 
competent person's duty to destroy such embryos. In the assumedly brief 
period from abandonment to destruction, the embryos would be res 
derelicta. Although this conclusion again minimally vindicates Robinson's 
premise that the Regulations fail to provide who the owner of an in vitro 
embryo will be in all possible situations, this failure – if one can even call it 
that – is relatively insignificant as it has a straight-forward solution. 
5.3 Embryo ownership and the Constitution 
Why does Regulation 18(2) vest ownership of in vitro embryos to the 
intended gestational mother, but leave possible other intended legal parents 
out in the cold? Similarly, why does Regulation 10(2)(c) concentrate all the 
decision-making power regarding the fate of the in vitro embryo in the 
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intended gestational mother, to the exclusion of possible other intended 
legal parents? To illustrate: In the context of a heterosexual couple where 
the woman is both the intended legal mother and the gestational mother, all 
these rights will vest in her, while the intended legal father will have no 
rights; in the context where this couple made use of a surrogate mother, all 
these rights will vest in the surrogate mother, while the commissioning 
couple will have no rights. The answer to these questions may be that public 
policy jealously guards the right of a pregnant woman to determine the 
future of her pregnancy. It is well established in our law that the in vivo 
embryo – id est the embryo in a woman's body – is legally not a distinct legal 
object, but merely a part of the woman's body, and consequently the woman 
is the sole decision-maker about the embryo's fate; the woman's right to 
bodily integrity outweighs the interests of the embryo's intended father, who 
has no legal control over the in vivo embryo's fate. However, the in vitro 
embryo is per definition outside a woman's body, and hence the woman's 
right to bodily integrity does not apply. I struggle to see how the 2012 
Regulations' privileging the intended gestational mother to the exclusion of 
possible other intended legal parents can be constitutionally justified. At 
least the right to equality and the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction are implicated. If a woman wants to proceed to use her in vitro 
embryos to become pregnant after ending the relationship with the embryo's 
biological father, what legal rights does the father have in terms of the 2012 
Regulations to stop her? Seemingly none. The father will have to rely 
directly on his constitutional rights. In this context of in vitro embryos, which 
is distinguishable from the context of in vivo embryos where the woman's 
right to bodily integrity applies, it can be argued that the right to make 
decisions regarding reproduction would entail that nobody can be forced to 
reproduce against their will, and that any one of the original intended legal 
parents should at any time be able to veto further use of the in vitro embryos.  
5.4 What happens to an embryo's legal status when it is placed in a 
woman's body? 
Once an in vitro embryo is transferred to a woman's uterus, what happens 
to the ownership of the embryo? I suggest that at the moment of transfer, 
the embryo qua distinct legal object ceases to exist, and becomes part of 
the woman's body. Accordingly, analogous with the common law doctrine 
of accessio, ownership of the embryo will cease to exist at the moment of 
transfer.  
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5.5 Ownership versus proprietary interest 
Should the concept "ownership" in Regulation 18(2) be replaced with 
"proprietary interest", as suggested by Van Niekerk and cited without 
critique by Robinson? I believe that such a move is unnecessary and only 
detracts from the actual constitutional problem inherent in the 2012 
Regulations, namely that the 2012 Regulations privilege the intended 
gestational mother to the exclusion of possible other intended legal parents. 
Also, regarding the in vitro embryo's legal subject/object status, replacing 
"ownership" with "proprietary interest" would make no difference, as the in 
vitro embryo would then simply be the object of a proprietary interest. 
6 Robinson's part-of-parents proposition  
6.1 Analysis  
Flowing from his rejection of ownership of in vitro embryos, Robinson 
suggests that an in vitro embryo is part of its parents' legal subjectivity. I 
understand Robinson to mean that from a legal perspective, an in vitro 
embryo is not a distinct entity with its own legal subject/object status, but 
rather part of both its parents, who are legal subjects. I will refer to this as 
the "part-of-parents proposition". Notable in the part-of-parents proposition 
is that it includes both parents. Given the concern that I have articulated 
above with the gender inequality inherent in the 2012 Regulations, I am 
sympathetic toward the inclusive nature of the part-of-parents proposition. 
However, I am unconvinced that the part-of-parents proposition is either an 
accurate description of the legal status quo (for reasons already discussed 
above), or an ideal legal position that is worth pursuing. 
In support of the part-of-parents proposition, Robinson draws an analogy 
between the parent-child legal relationship and the parent-embryo legal 
relationship. He points out that a human infant does not have personal 
capacity to act, and that his or her parents act on his or her behalf; he 
describes the legal subjectivity of the child as being "interwoven" with that 
of his or her parents. This analogy does not convince: First, the analogy 
does not logically support the part-of-parents proposition. Infants are legally 
distinct entities from their parents, and legal subjects in their own right. The 
part-of-parents proposition proposes something different, namely that the 
embryo is not a distinct legal entity, but is consumed within the parents' legal 
subjectivity. Second, from a legal policy perspective the analogy between 
the parent-child legal relationship and the parent-embryo legal relationship 
is untenable. Parents act on behalf of their child, and are expected to act in 
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their child's best interests. It is impossible for parents to act in the best 
interests of something that is simply part of themselves (according to the 
part-of-parents proposition), and therefore does not have any interests of its 
own.  
6.2 Recent case law provides conceptual clarity 
In footnote 98 of his article, Robinson refers to section 295(e) of the 
Children's Act18 in support of the part-of-parents proposition. This section 
reads as follows: 
A court may not confirm a surrogate motherhood agreement unless – … 
(e)  in general, having regard to the personal circumstances and 
family situations of all the parties concerned, but above all the 
interests of the child that is to be born, the agreement should be 
confirmed.  
In other words, Robinson appears to argue that this statutory protection of 
the best interests of the child that is to be born equates to the protection of 
the interests of the in vitro embryo. This is a conflation of the concepts "child 
that is to be born" and "in vitro embryo", and is incorrect.  
This very issue of whether the law can consider the best interests of an 
embryo came up in the 2018 case of Ex Parte KAF.19 The case was a 
surrogacy agreement confirmation hearing in the Johannesburg High Court. 
Prior to opting for surrogacy, the commissioning mother, K, underwent IVF 
treatment herself. For the purposes of such IVF treatment, K's fertility clinic 
created a number of embryos using her eggs and her husband's sperm. At 
the stage when K's healthcare practitioners declared her unable to carry a 
pregnancy to term she became eligible to use a surrogate mother, and four 
of these embryos were still unused and cryopreserved at the fertility clinic. 
The intention of the parties to the surrogacy agreement was to use these 
four already-created embryos for the surrogate pregnancy. During the 
hearing the question was raised as to whether the court should consider the 
best interests of these embryos in making its decision. The court provided 
a clear answer in its judgment:20 
the commissioning mother intends utilising four of the remaining embryos 
previously created for the purposes of IVF for the surrogacy agreement. Yet, 
                                            
18  Childrens Act 38 of 2005. 
19  Ex Parte KAF 2019 2 SA 510 (GJ). 
20  Ex Parte KAF 2019 2 SA 510 (GJ) para 14. 
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not one of these embryos can be legally equated with the "child that is to be 
born". 
In a footnote to this paragraph of the judgment, the court elaborated as 
follows:21 
The embryos are merely the human biological material that may … give rise 
to the child that is to be born.  
This judgment is profound, as it conceptually disentangles the embryo from 
the prospective child. The prospective child, whose interests are protected 
even before his or her birth, is an abstraction in our minds; he or she is not 
the same as the physical embryo. Stated differently, the prospective child is 
not as yet embodied in a physical body. But is it possible to protect the 
interests of the prospective child if he or she does not have a body? Yes, 
because actions that are taken in the present will have consequences in the 
future when, and if, the child comes into existence (and thereafter when the 
child is growing up). It should be clear, however, that protecting the interests 
of the prospective child is not the same as the notion of protecting an 
embryo.  
The question can be asked: What was the position pre-KAF? The answer 
is: the same. The KAF judgment made explicit what was already implicit in 
the law. Previous reported surrogacy-related judgments implicitly dealt with 
"the child that is to be born" as a mental abstraction of the child that may 
exist in future as a result of the surrogacy arrangement; there is no authority 
for interpreting "the child that is to be born" as referring to the embryo. Also, 
the following mind experiment illustrates why interpreting "the child that is 
to be born" as referring to the embryo can be rejected on the basis of legal 
principle. Assume for the sake of argument that the phrase "the interests of 
child that is to be born" does include embryos. Whenever there are already 
embryos in vitro, this would pose an impossible situation: given that all the 
embryos have an equal "interest" in realising their potential to develop into 
infants, which embryo should be chosen for transfer? There would be no 
grounds on which to decide, leading to paralysis. Clearly, this could not have 
been the intention of the Children's Act. 
6.3 Conclusion on the part-of-parents proposition  
The 2012 Regulations are deeply problematic, and the 2016 draft 
Regulations fail to address these problems. Does the part-of-parents 
proposition offer a solution? I suggest not. The reasons that Robinson 
                                            
21  Ex Parte KAF 2019 2 SA 510 (GJ) para 14. 
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tendered in support of the part-of-parents proposition are clearly contra the 
interpretation of the law by the Court. Also, the idea that an entity can be 
part of the legal subjectivity of two legal subjects is new and is hence veiled 
in legal uncertainty. Robinson does not provide reasons as to why such a 
novel legal idea will in practice work better than, for instance, a well-known 
legal concept like co-ownership.  
7 Robinson's critique of my 2005 article 
7.1 Overview of my 2005 article 
In my 2005 article I set out to answer three related questions:  
a) What is the legal status of the pre-embryo with relation to whether it is 
protected in any way? The legal status of the pre-embryo with relation 
to whether it has legal subjectivity or not was not my stated research 
question.  
b) What is the moral status of the pre-embryo?  
c) Is the pre-embryo's legal status in relation to protection aligned with its 
moral status, if any?  
I answered these questions as follows:  
a) The pre-embryo is not legally protected. The pre-embryo in vitro can 
in principle be used for training or research, and destroyed in the 
process; or it can simply be destroyed at the will of the recipient; also, 
the pre-embryo in vivo can be aborted at the will of the pregnant 
woman.  
b) The pre-embryo does not have moral status. My overarching argument 
in this regard can be summarised as follows: 
 Premise 1: Gametes do not have moral status. (Do you shed a 
tear for the sperm-massacre that occurs every time a man 
masturbates, or for the death of an egg every time a woman 
ovulates?)  
 Premise 2: Although there are many factual differences between 
the pre-embryo and the gametes that precede it in the process 
of reproduction, none of these differences is morally relevant.  
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 Conclusion: It would be inconsistent and arbitrary to allocate any 
moral status to the pre-embryo.  
c) Accordingly, the pre-embryo's legal status (of not being protected) is 
aligned with its (lack of) moral status.  
7.2 Critique and response 
Robinson's critique on my 2005 article is that I purportedly failed to answer 
my own research question of what the legal status of the pre-embryo is. 
Clearly, this critique is based on an overly narrow concept of the meaning 
of legal status as referring only to legal subject/object status. As I have 
explained above with reference to everyday examples, legal status can refer 
to any position that something or someone holds in law – not only legal 
subject/object status. Also, in my 2005 article I clearly stated that the kind 
of legal status I would be investigating was whether the pre-embryo is 
legally protected in any way. And this I have done, and I proposed an 
answer. 
Regarding the related but distinct question about the legal subject/object 
status of the in vitro embryo, I have now presented my view in this response 
article, and shown why I differ from Robinson's view. 
7.3 Invitation to engage in academic debate 
Most of my 2005 article is dedicated to analysing a broad spectrum of 
arguments relating to the moral status of the pre-embryo. These include 
arguments based on the pre-embryo’s being human life, having potential, 
having a complete and unique genotype, being a self-growing entity, and 
having symbolic value. In the context of the bio-politics of the in vitro 
embryo, it is essential to confront arguments about its moral status, as the 
law and ethics mutually influence each other. The moral status of the in vitro 
embryo is not only relevant in the context of infertility treatment, but will gain 
increasing significance with the advent of gene editing and in particular its 
application in humans. I therefore invite all interested South African legal 
and ethics scholars to engage with me on the arguments that I formulated 
in my 2005 article on the issue of the moral status of the in vitro embryo.  
A note for clarity: I do not claim that the moral status of the in vitro embryo 
is necessarily dispositive of all issues that relate to it, such as heritable 
genome editing. Various other ethical considerations would also be 
relevant. However, I do claim that the moral status of the in vitro embryo is 
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an indispensable, foundational consideration in any legal-ethical matter that 
relates to it.  
8 Conclusion 
In this article, I argued that the in vitro embryo is a legal object that is subject 
to ownership, and rejected Robinson's proposition that the in vitro embryo 
is included in its parents' legal subjectivity. By addressing practical issues 
related to embryo ownership, I attempted to highlight that my debate with 
Robinson is not just of legal theoretical relevance – the issue of embryo 
ownership has real-world ramifications for persons who make use of IVF, 
such as whether embryos can be inherited.  
As remarked by Khampepe J in the introduction to her dissenting judgment 
in AB v Minister of Social Development, new reproductive technologies 
"should be celebrated as they allow our society to flourish in ways previously 
impossible".22 People who may otherwise not be able to experience the 
wonder of pregnancy, of expecting a baby, and of raising children, are given 
this opportunity by new reproductive technologies. But the way in which 
extant law regulates these new reproductive technologies is a cause for 
concern. By ventilating the issue of embryo ownership, related problematic 
issues have been highlighted: the 2012 Regulations privilege women above 
men in the context of artificial reproduction. Also, the 2012 Regulations 
disregard a person's right not to reproduce most pertinently by failing to 
make provision for men to withdraw embryos containing their genetic 
material from the artificial reproduction process. These are serious 
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